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How to Think Seriously About the Planet: The Case for an Environmental Con-
servatism, by Roger Scruton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 464 
pages. $29.95 (cloth).
DANIEL E. RITCHIE, Bethel University
In Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas (1759), the eponymous hero and his compan-
ions meet an astronomer who may be the one person to have achieved 
what they’re seeking: true happiness. As their conversations progress, 
however, Rasselas begins to doubt this expert’s hold on reality. It tran-
spires that he believes he controls the weather:
I have possessed for five years the regulation of weather and the distribution 
of the seasons: the sun has listened to my dictates, and . . . the clouds, at my 
call, have poured their waters. . . . What must have been the misery of half 
the globe if I had limited the clouds to particular regions?
Rasselas asks the astronomer to consider whether he has confused his 
powers of prediction with those of control, but the man is insistent. He 
begs Rasselas accept his mantle of authority so that he can retire, leaving 
the weather under the control of Rasselas. The bemused hero agrees, and 
to his smiling friends Rasselas remarks, “Few can attain this man’s knowl-
edge and few practice his virtues. . . . There is no man whose imagination 
does not sometimes predominate over his reason.”
To Johnson, this expert, who grossly overestimates his reason and his 
ability to control nature, is insane. My, how times have changed! On Au-
gust 20, 2013, The New York Times reported “near certainty” that human 
activity causes most global warming. To express doubts about our rational 
grasp of environmental factors is now the insane position. And to doubt 
our ability to control nature is similarly suspect. On October 11, a Times 
op-ed promised that a global price on carbon dioxide was “the best way to 
. . . put global warming on [a] sharply decreasing path.”
The extent of our reason and our ability to control the outcome of our 
actions are subjected to sustained, intelligent analysis in Roger Scruton’s 
conservative approach to environmentalism. He doesn’t doubt that global 
warming has occurred (you may now exhale), or that human activity is a 
major cause (now take a long cleansing breath). He credits many in the 
environmental movement with the “knowledge and virtues,” extolled by 
Johnson, that we must seek and admire. His style is lively, and his tone is 
respectful and engaging. It is also pointed: he thinks that most large-scale 
attempts to regulate the environment have failed and are undermining the 
very resources we need to clean up and care for the world.
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Oikophilia
As perhaps the leader of Anglo-American conservative thought, Roger 
Scruton has earned the right to invent a new term. Let us therefore wel-
come his underlying principle of environmental conservatism, which he 
calls “oikophilia”:
a motive that comprehends all our deepest attachments, and which spills 
out in the moral aesthetic and spiritual emotions that transfigure our world, 
creating in the midst of our emergencies a shelter that future generations 
also may enjoy. (214–215)
From its literal meaning of “love of the household,” Scruton mines the 
rich vein of conservative thought, from Smith, Burke, Tocqueville, and 
others to fill out the “motive” that makes up oikophilia. It is nurtured by 
local attachment, gratitude, and “feedback loops” that keep environmen-
tal accountability and liability where they belong. It enables him to seek 
common cause with left-leaning Greens on the basis of their common love 
of local resources. For the most part, he argues, conservatives and Greens 
should be able to agree on how to use and care for these resources. His 
opponents are not so much environmentalists as “oikophobes”—those 
who seek transnational solutions that rest on command and control to the 
detriment of local, regional, and national attachments.
Scruton’s argument is straightforward: “environmental protection 
comes from the oikophilia of people, not from those who use money, in-
fluence and political power to impose large-scale projects from on high” 
(p. 349). It takes him until the middle of the book to adumbrate exactly 
what he means by oikophilia, but once there he fully delivers. Although 
he doesn’t mention Adam Smith in this connection, Scruton’s oikophilia 
is rooted in the moral sentiments. He rejects the model of a rational homo 
economicus with no concept of the ends of life. Instead, Scruton discerns in 
human beings the sentiments of gratitude, attachment, and piety. These 
motives—or sentiments—support sacrifice and responsibility to others.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Scruton’s approach and 
that of his opponents is that his oikophilia is based on love and friendship, 
“in which things around us are regarded as intrinsically meaningful and 
irreplaceable” (p. 256). His opponents often exhibit the combination of 
fear and control that motivated the astronomer in Rasselas. Over the last 
thirty years, for instance, the fear of environmental harm has produced the 
“Precautionary Principle,” the basis for the European Union’s approach to 
environmental policy under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Scruton considers 
it limitless and therefore useless:
When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect rela-
tionships are not fully established scientifically. (105)
This version of the principle, quoted from the 1998 Wingspread Statement, 
puts no limits on intervention and regulation. It overlooks the historic 
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resilience with which people respond—often quite successfully—to en-
vironmental problems and its consequences for nature. Virtually every 
activity, from the flatulence of cows to the use of ethanol, contains “threats 
of harm,” for which the statement provides no principle of discrimination. 
And it opens the door for a disdain of scientific analysis. The book is rife 
with well-documented examples of fear-based interventions, from over-
regulation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to anti-nuclear 
energy campaigns. One of his strongest examples of ill-managed efforts 
at control comes from the European Union’s “Common Fisheries Policy,” 
which overrode British and Danish coastal rights and saw fish stocks de-
cline steeply. In all of these cases, liability and risk are, for the most part, 
removed from the actual users of environmentally fragile resources.
By contrast, Scruton explains how British rivers recovered from in-
dustrial pollution (to take just one example) to illustrate the working of 
oikophilia. Although nineteenth-century Pollution Prevention Acts gave 
local authorities the power to act against polluters, they themselves were 
the ones discharging the sewage. Pollution worsened. The post-World War 
II socialist government was of no help either, as nationalized industries 
and politically privileged groups continued to shift liability and risk away 
from themselves. But when the civil courts recognized riparian property 
rights (1952), anglers’ clubs could defend the streams they used and loved, 
and the rivers and fish populations returned to health.
The practical elements of this process, Scruton observes, include a 
strong regime of property rights, local civic associations, and effective tort 
laws. These are three key elements of what Scruton calls, throughout the 
book, a “feedback loop.”
Feedback Loops
In Scruton’s view, property rights (or some analogue that distinguishes 
proper use from theft) are basic to good stewardship. Under state own-
ership or a property vacuum, no one is ultimately responsible for the 
rightful use of resources, resulting in desertification in Africa, overhunt-
ing by Native Americans, and environmental catastrophe in the former 
Soviet empire. My personal reason for doubting the effectiveness of state 
superintendence of the environment is simpler and comes from the fac-
ulty lounge: while professors are lecturing their classes on the evils of 
private ownership, they leave their food to rot in the communal refrigera-
tor. Outsource the fridge to a private contractor, and the bad food would 
vanish. Scruton sees property rights as the foundation—but only the foun-
dation—for long term, responsible use of environmental resources.
If the resources are renewable, such as fish, arable land, or timber, the 
relationship between care and stewardship is obvious. But Scruton takes 
on harder cases as well, which leads to the other “feedback” elements—
local associations and torts. Through negotiation with local institutions 
with real property rights—especially the National Trust, its forerunners 
and allies—historic buildings in Britain have been preserved, footpaths 
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recognized, organic townscapes nurtured, and environmentally friendly 
railroads built. Finally, an effective tort law ensures that those who inflict 
damages will pay them. Here, Scruton favors Ronald Coase’s argument 
on the problem of social cost as against A. C. Pigou’s view that regulatory 
action is the best solution to that problem. Regulation’s purpose is not to 
prevent risk, but to return transaction costs to those who incur them.
At this point it should be clear that Scruton, like most conservatives in 
the Burkean tradition, views human action arising from a combination 
of rational self-interest, love of the local, and cooperation. For the most 
part, his solution to the environmental “tragedy of the commons” rests 
on these elements, many of which are found in well functioning markets. 
He criticizes the caricature of market competition as little more than a 
dog-eat-dog contest. Like other conservatives, he admires Nobel Laureate 
Elinor Ostrom’s analysis of how institutions and citizens with local 
knowledge are often better at managing scarce resources than planners. 
Referring to her influential Governing the Commons (1990), he writes: “Mar-
kets, like the common pool arrangements discussed by Ostrom, depend 
on promise-keeping, conflict resolution and the punishment of cheats” 
(144). Surrounded by a robust “feedback loop,” he is optimistic about 
our prospects for maintaining the environment using these resources and 
sentiments.
Climate Change
Except for climate change.
Scruton states early on that global warming is different. For this prob-
lem, ordinary forms of resilience to environmental problems may be 
catastrophically inadequate and “negative feedback” too slow in coming. 
And so, in his final chapter—misleadingly titled “Modest Proposals”—he 
writes:
[W]e should introduce a flat-rate carbon tax. The more you emit, the more 
you pay. Moreover, this tax should be imposed on products regardless of 
their origin. . . . A sensible environmental policy must, therefore, concede 
an important role to the state: taxing carbon emissions, and funding the re-
search needed to reduce them. (387, 391)
This is the exception to the aim of a conservative environmental approach, 
as Scruton ultimately defines it: “to achieve a managed environment, in 
which good results arise spontaneously from what ordinary people do. 
This means maintaining or creating the feedback loops that cause people 
to bear the cost of their own activities, and to prevent them from passing 
that cost to future generations” (391–392). To me, the book is stronger for 
admitting this exception. I believe it was the first Mayor Daley who said 
that sometimes in politics it is necessary to rise above principle. And while 
that has a particular meaning in Chicago politics, I find it refreshing to see 
so principled a writer as Scruton come to the limits of his own perspective 
and embrace an exception.
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How to Think Seriously About the Planet provides the richest context 
of which I am aware for a conservative approach to environmentalism. 
The shameful treatment of Bjørn Lomborg and Richard Lindzen by the 
environmental establishment has produced such mistrust that many con-
servatives simply dismiss even its strongest consensus. It is to Scruton’s 
credit that he acknowledges these battles concisely, then moves beyond 
them. Unlike some conservatives, whose environmental thinking begins 
with property rights and ends with free markets, Scruton places these ele-
ments in the context of the feedback loops and oikophilia, which do justice 
to both the Burkean and (if I may add an American) Hamiltonian strains 
of conservatism. He has done much to move the discussion forward and 
deserves a wide audience.
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Renewing the Senses: A Study of the Philosophy and Theology of the Spiritual Life, 
by Mark R. Wynn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 206 pages. $99.00.
ROBERT MACSWAIN, The School of Theology, The University of the South
I am writing this review while sitting out on my covered screened-porch 
on a perfect Saturday afternoon in early October. The sky is a clear and 
flawless bright blue, the leaves are just starting to yellow, the temperature 
is around 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the humidity is low. Crows are caw-
ing in the woods around me, the wind is stirring the branches, and in the 
distance I can hear the muted sound of a dormitory air-conditioning unit. 
My bare feet are placed on the black and brown matted area-carpet and I 
can feel the weave with my toes; on the glass-topped coffee table in front 
of me, a plastic bottle of cold water has built up a cloudy but translucent 
skin of condensed droplets.
Mark Wynn’s latest book invites us to consider our perception and 
reception of such sensory details in greater depth, considering their im-
plications for philosophy, theology, and spirituality. Exemplifying a recent 
trend in Anglophone philosophy of religion, in which authors trained in 
the analytic tradition engage with topics normally associated with Con-
tinental philosophy, Wynn focuses on phenomenological issues without 
being a classical phenomenologist. Thus, using the term in its literal rather 
than technical sense, he says that Renewing the Senses can be read as a “phe-
nomenological rendering” of some central themes in David Brown’s God 
and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience (Oxford University 
Press, 2004) (8, note 9).1 Wynn explores the general claim that “religious 
1I reviewed this volume of Brown’s, along with four others, in Faith and Philosophy 29 
(2012), 362–366.
